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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court recently dipped its toe into longstanding debates about judicial takings in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
1
Protection, the intimation that the Court might finally recognize the
2
doctrine generated a wave of responses. Commentators concerned
with the expansion of regulatory takings jurisprudence argued that it
3
would be unwise to apply the Takings Clause to the judiciary; those
inclined to defend a more vigorous application of the Clause, perhaps
4
not surprisingly, saw a promising new avenue of vindication.
*

Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School.
1. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
2. Judicial takings involve the proposition that not only legislative and executive action
might violate the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, but a decision interpreting a state’s
common law of property might also be violative when it functions as the equivalent of an
affirmative exercise of eminent domain. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial
Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449 (1990). The closest the Court had gotten to recognizing that a
judicial decision might constitute a taking of private property was Justice Stewart’s concurrence
in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296–98 (1967). See also Stevens v. City of Cannon
Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1207 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
3. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary Is
Different, 35 VT. L. REV. 475, 475–76 (2010) (arguing that the Takings Clause should not extend
to the judicial branch); Barton Thompson, Judicial Takings Redux: Stop the Beach
Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection 4 (Nov. 5, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.boalt.org/elq/documents/takingsconference_Thomson_20
10_1025.pdf (“Those justices (and members of the academy and bar) already skeptical of
expansive takings protections are unlikely to advocate for their extension to courts, further
constraining the ability of the state to adapt property law to changing knowledge, conditions,
and norms.”).
4. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 3, at 6 (arguing that Stop the Beach Renourishment and
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In recent years, whenever the Court has commented on aspects of
takings jurisprudence, a perennial tension has resurfaced between
concerns about limitations on the government’s flexibility to adjust
property rights over time and the recognition of limits on that
perceived interference with individual property rights. Thus,
arguments about this balance have reemerged following decisions
5
about the standard for public use, the role of notice in regulatory
6
7
takings, the limits on land-use conditions and exactions, and others.
The question whether a judicial act can violate the Fourteenth
Amendment’s incorporation of the Fifth Amendment may seem an
unremarkable new ground for this running debate, with the real
conceptual challenge lying in the relevant substantive standard for
determining when a judicial act, to borrow Justice Holmes’s
8
memorably cryptic phrase, “goes too far.”
The threshold proposition that a judicial decision elucidating the
contours of common-law property rights is state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment, however, puts Stop the Beach
Renourishment in a different category than many of the Court’s
recent forays into takings. Constitutional property cases often present
starkly different conceptions of the role of the state in private
property. On the one hand, private property is understood as
relatively fixed according to long-standing common-law doctrine that
reflects almost pre-political norms of ownership and exclusion—a
view to which Justice Scalia seems to subscribe. On the other hand,

judicial takings “can serve as useful reminders to state courts of the importance of property
precedents”); D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. RICH. L. REV.
903, 904 (2011) (exploring how courts can implement judicial takings doctrine).
5. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
6. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626 (2001).
7. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 377 (1994).
8. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Justice Scalia, in the Stop the Beach
Renourishment plurality, brushed aside this challenge, asserting simply that a decision that
“declares that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists”
constitutes a taking. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct.
2592, 2596 (2010). What standard will guide that determination—in other words, what
constitutes “established” rights and what kinds of decisions should be understood to eliminate
such rights—is only hinted at in a footnote in which Justice Scalia makes clear that any such
determination that there has been a change in state law should be made without deference to
the very state judges responsible for defining that law. Id. at 2608 n.9. For an argument for
applying a natural law standard for determining when a state common-law decision transgresses
the Takings Clause, see Richard A. Epstein, Littoral Rights under the Takings Doctrine: The
Clash Between the Ius Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 37 (2011).
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some Justices seem to embrace a more legal realist approach that
recognizes the interrelation between the contingency of property
rights and the inherent centrality of the state in defining and
9
moderating this aspect of private ordering.
In many ways, a high-water mark for the realist conception of
10
property came in the famous 1948 decision Shelley v. Kraemer, a case
that involved judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.
After finding that the covenants would be legally unobjectionable if
11
left entirely in the realm of “voluntary adherence,” the Court held
that the act of judicial enforcement brought the covenants into the
realm of state action, and thus amenable to review under the Equal
12
Protection Clause. The Court has never fully embraced the
implications of this view of the state role in defining private property
and in fact rarely recognizes state action in other circumstances that
13
might logically dictate a straightforward application of Shelley. As a
result, Shelley has largely been limited to its own context and the
Court has resisted expanding the realm of decisions involving private
14
property that could be considered state action.
Few would lightly associate Justice Scalia and the other members
of the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality with core realist
understandings of property, but the framework the plurality deployed
to find judicial opinions subject to review under the Takings Clause
resonates strongly with the Court’s earlier approach to state action in
Shelley. Justice Scalia’s argument in Stop the Beach Renourishment is
grounded largely in text and what he saw as a conceptually
problematic attempt to impose a state separation of powers doctrine
15
as a matter of federal constitutional law. Simply put, Justice Scalia
argued, if a legislative or executive act can be considered state action,
then the same can be said of a judicial decision, thus opening the
possibility of recognizing the state role in a much broader array of
property disputes.
9. For a discussion of competing approaches, see Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property,
91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1558–66 (2003).
10. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
11. Id. at 13.
12. Id. at 20.
13. See generally Developments in the Law, State Action and the Public/Private Distinction,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1261–64 (2010) (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s turn toward
neoformalism in state-action doctrine and scholarly critique of that turn).
14. Id.
15. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2605
(2010).
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It would be naïve to argue that the plurality’s logic could—or
necessarily should—revive Shelley’s implicit promise of weighing a
broader array of individual rights in property disputes. Nevertheless,
the felt necessity remains for finding guidance in constitutional rights
in the oversight of private property regimes that implicate equality,
16
due process, free speech, and other values. Accordingly, that some
measure of blurring between public and private is a logical
consequence of the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality may
mean that a doctrine of judicial takings is worth defending for those
concerned with Shelley’s legacy.
II. THE SHORT HALF-LIFE OF SHELLEY V. KRAEMER
Shelley v. Kraemer still stands as a landmark case, continuing to
form a part of the basic property canon, but nonetheless seems like an
odd outlier. The case arose in the era before the Fair Housing Act and
other statutes generally barred private discrimination in real
17
property. Shelley consolidated two similar cases, each involving an
attempt by an African-American family to purchase a home in
18
violation of a racially restrictive covenant. In each case, neighbors
sued to void the relevant sales, and in each case, the lower courts
ultimately agreed to enforce the covenants and bar the owners from
19
occupying the property they had purchased.
The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether
“judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements” violated the
16. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer’s Fiftieth Anniversary: “A Time for
Keeping; A Time for Throwing Away”?, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 100 (1998) (“Examples abound
of situations in which individuals seek constitutional protection against what are essentially
private actions.”).
17. Congress passed Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A § 3601 et seq.
(West 2010), at a time when the Court was also revising its understanding of the coverage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. That Act, which textually barred private racial discrimination in
property and related contractual relations, see 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981–1982 (West 2010), had been
understood for more than a century to require state action. The Court in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968), however, held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 applies to
private discrimination.
18. The first of the two consolidated cases came out of St. Louis, Missouri; the other out of
Detroit, Michigan. The covenant in the first case provided that for a period of fifty years, “no
part of said property . . . shall be occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race, it being
intended hereby to restrict the use of said property for said period of time against the occupancy
as owners or tenants of any portion of said property for resident or other purpose by people of
the Negro or Mongolian Race.” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4–5. Likewise, the second
covenant provided that the relevant property “shall not be used or occupied by any person or
persons except those of the Caucasian race.” Id. at 6.
19. Id. at 6–7.
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. At the outset,
the Court, with Chief Justice Vinson writing, distinguished the private
covenants at issue from state action that mandated discrimination, as
21
with ordinances that required segregation or that limited occupation
22
on the basis of race. The Court made clear that, unlike an ordinance,
racially restrictive covenants as such
cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to
petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the
purposes of the agreement are effectuated by voluntary adherence
to their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action
by the State, and the provisions of the Amendment have not been
23
violated.

The Court, however, did not stop with that recognition of the
distinction between direct state discrimination and the challenged
private covenants. “[H]ere there was more,” the Court noted; in the
cases at issue, “the purposes of the agreements were secured only by
24
judicial enforcement by state courts.” The Court’s theory of state
action flowed in clear terms, beginning with the Fourteenth
25
Amendment’s text. Thus a state, the Court went on, “may act
through different agencies, either by its legislative, its executive, or its
judicial authorities, and the prohibitions of the amendment extend to
all action of the State denying equal protection of the laws, whether it
26
be action by one of these agencies or by another.” Likewise, state
action under the Amendment includes judicial action and, the Court
noted, “it has never been suggested that state court action is
immunized from the operation of those provisions simply because the
27
act is that of the judicial branch of state government.” Textually and
structurally, the Court found, the Fourteenth Amendment draws no
28
distinctions between various state actors.
20. Id. at 7. Petitioners in the case also raised Due Process and Privileges and Immunities
Clause challenges, but the Court resolved the case under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 23.
21. Id. at 11–13 (citing Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (striking down, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a municipal ordinance that prohibited “colored” persons from moving
into majority-white blocks and white people from moving into majority-“colored” blocks) and
Harmon v. Taylor, 273 U.S. 668 (1927) (similar)).
22. Id. at 12 (citing City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930)).
23. Id. at 13.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 14.
26. Id. (quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879)).
27. Id. at 18; see id. at 20 (“State action, as that phrase is understood for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all forms.”).
28. Id. at 20.
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The Court concluded, “[w]e have no doubt that there has been
state action in these cases in the full and complete sense of the
29
phrase.” The enforcement of the restrictive covenants represented an
instance in which “the States have made available to [private]
individuals the full coercive power of government,” and, accordingly,
“the power of the State to create and enforce property interests must
be exercised within boundaries defined by the Fourteenth
30
Amendment.”
In terms of conceptions of property, it is hard to imagine a clearer
illustration than Shelley of the realist insight that property is an
inherently three-part relationship between the entitlement holder, the
state, and everyone else. As Felix Cohen famously put it, property can
be thought of metaphorically as an object with a label that reads:
To the world:
Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may
grant or withhold.
Signed: Private citizen
31

Endorsed: The state.

When the discriminating neighbors in Shelley called the
endorsement for all it was worth, they were asserting their purported
right to say to African-American purchasers “keep off,” and the lower
courts obliged. The Supreme Court in turn made pellucid the
necessity for the state to be involved in order for the private citizen’s
32
rights to have meaning.
In the history of antidiscrimination jurisprudence, Shelley
represents at once a landmark achievement and a reminder of paths
33
glimpsed and then abandoned by the Court. There are many reasons
29. Id. at 19.
30. Id. at 22.
31. Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954). For
a classic general realist discussion of the role of the state in the enforcement of private ordering,
see ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW (1952).
32. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19 (“The difference between judicial enforcement and
nonenforcement of the restrictive covenants is the difference to petitioners between being
denied rights of property available to other members of the community and being accorded full
enjoyment of those rights on an equal footing.”).
33. See Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
473 (1962); see also Martin A. Schwartz & Erwin Chemerinsky, Dialogue on State Action, 16
TOURO L. REV. 775, 779–86 (2000) (surveying state-action cases involving racial discrimination
and contrasting to non-race cases).
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why Shelley proved limited as a conceptual framework for judicial
oversight of private property arrangements that might infringe on
individual rights. The most central, however, was likely the seemingly
untenable implications of a doctrine that could have rendered all
judicial enforcement of private ordering constitutionally suspect. As
Professor Mark Rosen recently noted, Shelley “threatened to dissolve
the distinction between state action, to which Fourteenth Amendment
limitations apply, and private action, which falls outside the
34
Fourteenth Amendment.” That possibility, however, is just as evident
35
in Stop the Beach Renourishment.
III. REREADING SHELLEY AFTER STOP THE BEACH
RENOURISHMENT
It is not uncommon to see Shelley invoked to bolster the argument
for judicial takings, including in the pleadings before the Court in Stop
36
the Beach Renourishment. It is perhaps not surprising, but is striking
nonetheless, how closely the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality’s
reasoning seems to echo Shelley’s logic.
Justice Scalia’s approach in Stop the Beach Renourishment was
simple and blunt. He began, inevitably, with text. “The Takings
Clause,” Justice Scalia noted, “unlike, for instance, the Ex Post Facto
Clauses . . . is not addressed to the action of a specific branch or
branches. It is concerned simply with the act, not the government
37
actor.” There is “no textual justification,” Justice Scalia continued,
34. Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95
CAL. L. REV. 451, 453 (2007).
35. The brief promise of Shelley’s approach to state action parallels a similar conceptual
opening for finding a different balance between private property and public law values that
began with Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that a privately held “company
town” was subject to constitutional scrutiny), and essentially closed with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507, 517 (1976) (applying the Marsh test to shopping malls would “‘wholly disregard[] the
constitutional basis on which private ownership of property rests in this country’” (quoting
Amalgamated Food Emps. Union v. Local Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 332 (1968) (Black, J.,
dissenting))). The theory in Marsh was that a private owner was essentially acting in a state role,
but the result was quite similar to Shelley’s implication that under the right circumstances, the
private right to exclude in state law must yield to federal constitutional rights of those against
whom that right is asserted.
36. This tendency goes all the way back to Professor Thompson’s early seminal treatment,
see Thompson, supra note 2, at 1456, and continued with amici before the Court in Stop the
Beach Renourishment, see Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Home Builders and
Florida Association of Home Builders as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4–5, Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
37. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601
(2010) (“nor shall private property be taken . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. Const. amend
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“for saying that the existence or scope of a State’s power to
expropriate private property without just compensation varies
38
according to the branch of government effecting the expropriation.”
To Justice Scalia, this plain language reading of the Takings Clause
has the force of common sense. “It would be absurd to allow a State
to do by judicial decree,” he argued, “what the Takings Clause forbids
39
it to do by legislative fiat.” In sum, Justice Scalia concluded, “the
Takings Clause bars the State from taking private property without
paying for it, no matter which branch is the instrument of the
40
taking.” To the argument made by Justice Kennedy in concurrence
that the Takings Clause should not apply to courts because the
judiciary is not designed to make policy choices and is not politically
accountable, Justice Scalia responded that while these “reasons may
have a lot to do with sound separation of powers principles that ought
to govern a democratic society,” such political process rationales
“have nothing whatever to do with the protection of individual rights .
41
. . .”
Justice Scalia’s entire textual and structural argument for allowing
judicial review of allegations that a state-court decision has “taken”
property applies with equal force to any other individual right
incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in the relevant
text, or in any constitutional structural principle, insulates courts from
accountability when courts act in ways that contravene individual
rights constraints on the state. In short, the Stop the Beach
Renourishment plurality reaches the same conclusion that Chief
Justice Vinson did in Shelley, and by almost the same path.
There are ways, of course, to distinguish Shelley from Justice
Scalia’s paradigmatic judicial taking. First, Shelley arose from the
enforcement of private covenants, whereas Stop the Beach
Renourishment involved the judicial definition of common-law
property rights. Second, the fact that the challenged elimination of
property rights in Stop the Beach Renourishment accrued to the
benefit of the state, as opposed to a decision resolving a conflict

V)).
38. Id. Justice Scalia focused on the text of the Fifth Amendment, but he noted earlier in
the opinion that the Fifth Amendment applied in this case through its incorporation in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2597.
39. Id. at 2601.
40. Id. at 2602.
41. Id. at 2605.
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42

between two private parties, might be significant. Third, there may
be an argument that would distinguish the clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment at issue in each case. Each of these potential grounds,
however, for distinguishing judicial takings from other constitutional
property decisions with respect to the issue of state action seem
unconvincing.
On the first point, although the question of enforcement versus
substantive definition might make some difference with respect to the
ground for liability (under the Equal Protection Clause, the Takings
Clause, or otherwise), it is difficult to see how the distinction could
matter for whether there has been state action. Indeed, except for the
rare instance of a court that issues advisory opinions, such as the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, a state court is almost always
going to define the scope of property rights in the context of a dispute
between litigants.
The inevitability of state-court dispute resolution leads to the
second potential distinction: that it might somehow make a difference
that the potential beneficiary of the judicial decision is the state,
rather than another private party. Some scholars, most notably
Professor Joseph Sax, have drawn a distinction between proprietary
and nonproprietary governmental actions in the regulatory takings
43
context, suggesting the need for more searching oversight when the
42. In a post, Professor Lior Strahilevitz thoughtfully argued that the “best way to make
sense of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment is that judicial
takings arise only in those instances in which the government now owns property that was
previously held by a private party.” Lior Strahilevitz, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Kelo, and
the Future of Judicial Takings, U. CHI. L. SCH. FACULTY BLOG (June 17, 2010, 3:32 PM),
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2010/06/stop-the-beach-renourishment-kelo-and-thefutu
re-of-judicial-takings.html#tp. Strahilevitz reached this conclusion through two pieces of
evidence. First, he noted that Justice Scalia made clear in Stop the Beach Renourishment that
the remedy for a finding of a judicial taking is invalidation; to this he added Justice Scalia’s
apparent view from the dissent the Justice joined in Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494
(2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), that absent blight, the “public use” requirement of the
Takings Clause bars private-to-private transfers. Strahilevitz, supra. This argument, however,
may conflate limits on the affirmative exercise of the power of eminent domain that the Kelo
dissenters would have imposed with the general question whether an exercise of the police
power (or other state power) constitutes a taking. It may be that in a given instance, the private
nature of the recipient would cause a regulatory regime to fail, if it were a taking, for lack of
public use, but regulations that transfer valuable property rights for the benefit of private
parties are commonplace.
43. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 63 (1964) (“[W]hen
economic loss is incurred as a result of government enhancement of its resource position in its
enterprise capacity, then compensation is constitutionally required; it is that result which is to be
characterized as a taking. But losses, however severe, incurred as a consequence of government
acting merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed as a non-compensable exercise of the
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government seeks to benefit itself rather than resolve disputes
between private parties. As interesting as it would be to see Justice
Scalia endorse this distinction, the logic of the plurality cannot
support that. While not always clear, the basic thrust of the plurality’s
approach seems to suggest that in any situation in which it would
violate the Takings Clause for a legislature to declare the property of
44
private party A to be the property of private party B, the same act in
a private suit would be a judicial taking. On Justice Scalia’s logic, it is
not where the property right goes after it is taken, but rather the fact
of the expropriation itself—the destruction of the established right—
45
that matters.
Indeed, nothing in Justice Scalia’s takings jurisprudence, or, for
that matter, in the Court’s approach to regulatory takings writ large,
suggests a distinction between invasions of property rights that
benefit the state and those that benefit private parties. The force of
Justice Scalia’s argument for recognizing judicial takings turns on the
proposition that there are neither textual nor institutional reasons to
distinguish courts as arms of the state for purposes of review.
Nowhere do the traditional kinds of political process rationales for
cabining state legislative and executive action (such as fiscal illusion
and the risk of abuse of the minority) appear in the plurality’s
46
rationale. And, more generally, regulatory takings cases regularly
police power.”).
44. Private-to-private transfers of property by the state do occur, and the Court made clear
in Kelo that the question whether such a transfer satisfies the Public Use Clause turns on
whether there is a sufficient public purpose. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (“The disposition of this
case . . . turns on the question whether the City’s development plan serves a ‘public purpose.’”);
see also id. at 477 (“Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long
been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of
transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the
other hand, it is equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to
another if future ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a
railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example.”).
45. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2601 (2010) (noting that “though the classic taking is a transfer of property to the State or to
another private party by eminent domain, the Takings Clause applies to other state actions that
achieve the same thing” and “our doctrine of regulatory takings ‘aims to identify regulatory
actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking’” (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005))). It is true that in enumerating general principles that govern
takings jurisprudence, Justice Scalia notes “we approach the situation before us” in the category
of takings that involves “States . . . recharacteriz[ing] as public property what was previously
private property.” Id. Nothing in the rest of the plurality opinion, however, suggests that the
potential ground for takings liability—that recharacterization—is the only kind of judicial
decision that might transgress the Takings Clause.
46. Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia criticized Justice Kennedy’s invocation of
judicial restraint by arguing that the Court should not impose some kind of federal
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involve private beneficiaries, as with the traditional private
47
mill/flooding cases and the modern “permanent physical invasion”
48
cases.
Finally, the logic of the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality
provides no basis for drawing distinctions on the question of state
action between the various provisions of the Bill of Rights
49
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. Text and
structural logic, shorn of context and purposive reading, have the
virtue of clarity, but the very same arguments would seem to apply to
any substantive provision incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment. This all the more so, given that the relevant harm (in
Stop the Beach Renourishment, a judicial decision alleged to have
eliminated established property rights) is in no way relevant to the
question whether state action embodied in a judicial decision might
transgress individual rights. Had Justice Scalia relied on a purposive
reading of the Takings Clause, somehow elevating and distinguishing
the particular property rights at issue for purposes of the state-action
analysis, this distinction might make sense. That, however, is not the
50
approach he took in the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality.
State action remains as much a flashpoint when it comes to the
definition and enforcement of private property rights as it is in the
51
larger discourse on the public/private divide. As easy as it is to point
out routine judicial enforcement of private arrangements that would
likely transgress various constitutional provisions, the felt necessity to

constitutional separation of powers limitation upon the states, Stop the Beach Renourishment,
130 S. Ct. at 2605, suggesting that Justice Scalia’s analysis is predicated on institutional
equivalence, not the risk of state aggrandizement.
47. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177–78 (1871) (finding
a taking under a state eminent domain provision, where a company had been authorized to
build a dam and flooded property as a result).
48. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (finding a per se
taking in law that authorized the permanent physical occupation of an apartment building by
wire owned by a cable television company).
49. One could argue that the text and concept of the “state” for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause (“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law”) somehow varies from the same text and concept a clause
later, which does not itself reference the state (“nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws”). Given the interdependence of these clauses, it is hard to see a
distinction on this point.
50. Chief Justice Vinson in Shelley was more explicitly animated by a purposive reading of
the Equal Protection Clause. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948) (discussing the
historical context in which the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified and the purposes it was
chiefly designed to achieve).
51. See Developments in the Law, supra note 13.
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invoke constitutional protection where the judiciary enforces
52
seemingly private claims for property continues to surface. Thus, for
example, in a number of common interest community cases,
governance regimes that functionally resemble traditional local
53
government actions generate calls for constitutional oversight.
Though such claims are rarely validated, people subject to judicial
enforcement of covenants that limit free speech, due process, equal
protection, and other fundamental values argue that such judicial
54
enforcement should come within the ambit of state action.
The persistence of claims for the constitutionalization of property
disputes highlights a dilemma for those inclined to see merit in a
broader state-action doctrine. The Takings Clause tends to find
relatively little support compared to other enumerated federal
constitutional rights from scholars otherwise inclined toward a
55
vigorous view of individual rights. This point is only worth
mentioning to note that the Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality
highlights that Takings Clause exceptionalism works both ways.
Structural constitutional rules developed to protect property rights—
the animating spirit of the plurality—can as easily apply to other
individual rights.
IV. PROPERTY’S COMMON LAW EVOLUTION
AND RHETORICAL FEINTS
On one level, an overly intrusive takings doctrine risks limiting
important state flexibility to respond to evolving understandings of
harm and public exigency. This might seem troubling if Stop the Beach
Renourishment engenders litigation as advocates and courts try to
give life to the plurality’s approach (and perhaps persuade Justice
Kennedy). This early wave of litigation is especially likely given that
the plurality did not explicitly limit the scope of judicial takings to
cases where the state is the beneficiary of the decision, which means
52. See Saxer, supra note 16, at 91–102. For a discussion of common-law alternatives to
achieve the substantive goals advocated by those who would expand Shelley’s approach to state
action, see id. at 102–19.
53. See, e.g., Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners Ass’n, 929 A.2d
1060 (2007) (involving restrictions on expressive conduct imposed by a homeowners'
association).
54. See also supra note 35 (discussing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)).
55. See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 139–41 (3d ed. 2008) (“[I]t is difficult to
reconcile the subordination of property rights with the specific property guarantees in the
Constitution.”).
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that any change in property law that is thought to eliminate an
56
established property right might be fair game.
On another level, however, Stop the Beach Renourishment may
prove to be another instance in which the Court seems to draw a
fundamental line in takings doctrine, the implications of which then
turn out to be relatively minor. The best example of this kind of
57
rhetorical feint is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. Although
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Lucas advanced a seemingly
uncompromising view of the Takings Clause, the opinion included an
58
exception for restrictions that inhere in title. Justice Kennedy has
subsequently suggested that legislative enactments, no less than
judicial decisions, can create the background principles that form the
59
basis for the Lucas exception. Lower courts, moreover, have been
quite comfortable recognizing that the common law of property has
give in its joints; thus, for compensation purposes, legislative acts are
often judged by conceptions of harm that are not frozen in the realm
60
of nineteenth-century nuisance law.
Likewise, the exchange between Justice Scalia and Justice
Kennedy in Stop the Beach Renourishment about the nature of
evolutionary norms in common-law property doctrine reveals a basic
disagreement about when a change in law might transgress either the
Takings Clause (for Justice Scalia) or the Due Process Clause (for
Justice Kennedy). Justice Scalia, echoing his view about the
narrowness of background principles of state law in Lucas, asserted
that the Framers could not have contemplated judicial takings
because “the Constitution was adopted in an era when courts had no
61
power to ‘change’ the common law.” Furthermore, in Justice Scalia’s
view, even when courts began to recognize an evolutionary common
law, “it is not true that the new ‘common-law tradition . . . allow[ed]
62
for incremental modifications to property law.’” Justice Kennedy, by
contrast, highlighted that the state common law of property includes
“incremental modification” that “owners may reasonably expect or

56. See supra text accompanying notes 43–45.
57. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
58. Id. at 1029.
59. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629 (2001).
60. See Richard J. Lazarus, Lucas Unspun, 16 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2007)
(discussing Lucas’s reception).
61. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2606
(2010).
62. Id.
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63

anticipate courts to make.” Although Justice Kennedy is less than
clear about how far this principle goes, the view of the evolutionary
nature of private property and the expectations of most owners that
he expressed in his Stop the Beach Renourishment concurrence seem
likely to prevail if judicial takings are recognized.
As with Lucas—the paradigm of what Laura Underkuffler has
64
called the “Scalian” view of property —the parade of horribles that
might flow from accepting the substantive concern underlying judicial
takings is unlikely to emerge. This is because, as Stop the Beach
Renourishment itself demonstrates, Justice Scalia’s apparently broad
view of what constitutes a clear contravention of existing law is not
widely shared, and most courts are likely to find Justice Kennedy’s
view of the flexibility of the common law more amenable. Thus,
finding a true expropriating judicial decision—like a regulation that
destroys all economic value without a countervailing background
65
principle of state law—is likely to be exceedingly rare in practice.
The Stop the Beach Renourishment plurality, in short, is likely to
be a wonderful source of intellectual puzzles, but is built on a
predicate sufficiently rare that it amounts to an almost abstract
question. As a result, those who are concerned that a broader
recognition of the role of the state in enforcing private property
norms will limit needed flexibility in economic regulation more
generally may have little to fear.
V. CONCLUSION
It is too soon to know if the Stop the Beach Renourishment
plurality will be remembered more as Pandora or Pirandello—the
unleashing of a plague or simply a slightly absurd set piece (one
characteristic in search of authority?). At the least, the decision has
revived, even if momentarily, long-standing questions about the
constitutional dimension of the judicial role in otherwise seemingly
63. Id. at 2613–18 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
64. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of
Property and Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727, 728 (2004) (describing this view as holding that
“the idea of property is a concrete, objectively knowable, and immutable legal barrier which
marks the boundary between protected individual interests and the permissible exercise of
government power”).
65. In retrospect, the Justice who seemed to have understood Lucas best was Justice
Souter; he would have dismissed the case as improvidently granted because the factual predicate
was so implausible. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1076–79 (statement of Souter,
J.).
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private aspects of property. While that, too, may prove fleeting, it does
provide an opportunity to reflect on aspects of the state role that are
often left unnoted.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, then, may have a silver lining for
those concerned with the potential for private property to transgress
public law norms. The case can provide a contemporary argument for
understanding that judicial decisions setting the terms of private
property may, in some circumstances, merit review for conformance
with constitutional norms. Is it likely that the plurality’s approach will
generate a flood of homeowner association due process cases or First
Amendment suits against malls that limit speech? Most likely not, but
the impulse to weigh private interests against constitutional values
remains and Stop the Beach Renourishment provides a reminder of
the importance of reflecting on that balance.

